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I
n 2010, firms operating in the United States found them-
selves in lawsuits initiated by nonpracticing entities (NPEs) 
more than 2,600 times. That is a five-fold increase over 2004. 
Is this trend worrisome?
NPEs are firms that do not produce goods. Rather, they 
acquire patents in order to license them to others. In principle, 
NPEs can perform the socially valuable function of facilitating 
markets for technology. Some inventors lack the resources and 
expertise needed to successfully license their technologies or, if 
necessary, enforce their patents. NPEs provide a way for these 
inventors to earn rents that they might not realize otherwise, thus 
providing them with greater incentives to innovate. For example, 
economic historians find evidence of a robust market for technol-
ogy during the 19th century that allowed individual inventors to 
earn returns on their inventions in the era before the rise of the 
large research and development laboratories. Optimists argue 
that the current crop of NPEs perform a similar function and 
should not be discouraged.
Critics, including many technology firms, compare these 
NPEs to the mythical trolls who hide under bridges built by 
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other people, unexpectedly popping up to demand payment of 
tolls. The critics call NPEs “patent trolls,” claiming that they buy 
up vaguely worded patents that can be construed to cover estab-
lished technologies and use them opportunistically to extract 
licensing fees from the real innovators. Indeed, there has been a 
general and dramatic rise in patent litigation that some analysts 
attribute to rapid growth in the number of patents with unclear 
or unpredictable boundaries. 
To the extent that the recent NPEs opportunistically assert 
“fuzzy patents” against real technology firms, they can decrease 
the incentives for these firms to innovate. Innovators deciding 
to invest in new technology have to consider the risk of inadver-
tent infringement as a cost of doing business. This risk reduces 
the rents they can expect to earn on their investment and hence 
decreases their willingness to invest.
This article makes several findings about this litigation. First, by 
observing what happens to a defendant’s stock price around the 
filing of a patent lawsuit, we are able to assess the effect of the law-
suit on the firm’s wealth, after taking into account general market 
trends and random factors affecting the individual stock. We find 
that NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion dollars of lost 
wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010. During the last four 
years, the lost wealth has averaged over $80 billion per year. These 
defendants are mostly technology companies that invest heavily in 
R&D. To the extent that this litigation represents an unavoidable 
business cost to technology developers, it reduces the profits that 
these firms make on their technology investments. That is, these 
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Second, by exploring publicly listed NPEs, we find that very 
little of this loss of wealth represents a transfer to inventors. This 
suggests that the loss of incentives to the defendant firms is not 
matched by an increase in incentives to other inventors.
Third, the characteristics of this litigation are distinctive: it is 
focused on software and related technologies, it targets firms that 
have already developed technology, and most of these lawsuits 
involve multiple large companies as defendants. These charac-
teristics suggest that this litigation exploits weaknesses in the 
patent system. In the 2008 book Patent Failure, two of us (Bessen 
and Meurer) argue that patents on software and business meth-
ods are litigated much more frequently because they have “fuzzy 
boundaries.” The scope of these patents is not clear, they are often 
written in vague language, and technology companies cannot 
easily find them and understand what they claim. It appears that 
much of the NPE litigation takes advantages of these weaknesses.
We conclude that the loss of billions of dollars of wealth 
associated with these lawsuits harms society. While the lawsuits 
increase incentives to acquire vague, overreaching patents, they 
decrease incentives for real innovation overall. 
Data and Methods
The data for this research come from two primary sources. The 
first source is an extensive database of NPE lawsuits generously 
provided by PatentFreedom, an organization devoted to research-
ing and providing information on NPE behavior and activities. 
PatentFreedom defines nonpracticing entities as companies that 
“do not practice their inventions in products or service, or other-
wise derive a substantial portion of their revenues from the sale 
of products and services in the marketplace. Instead, NPEs seek 
to derive the majority of their income from the enforcement of 
patent rights.” Since we study litigation, we only focus on those 
NPEs that file lawsuits (“patent assertion entities”).
The second data source is the Center for Research in Security 
Prices’ (CRSP) U.S. Stock Database, a comprehensive collection 
of security information. Using these sources, a sample comprised 
of all instances in which a known NPE sued a publicly traded firm 
between 1990 and October 2010 was constructed. This was done 
by first matching defendant names with a previously constructed 
list of public domestic firms and subsidiaries using a software 
program, and then manually reviewing the resulting list and 
updating matches that had been either missed or incorrectly 
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assigned by the software. To assess the validity and coverage of the 
matches, a random sample of 100 parties was manually checked 
using corporate websites and CRSP’s Company Code Lookup 
tool. For this sample, while 11 percent of parties that were either 
public companies or their subsidiaries were left unmatched, there 
were no false positives.
This process yielded a sample of 1,630 lawsuits filed by an NPE 
against one or more publicly listed defendants. Because many of 
these lawsuits were filed against multiple defendants, the total 
number of events in the sample 
was substantially higher than 
the number of suits, at 4,114 
(for the sample using a five-day 
window to measure the returns).
Finally, we linked the data in 
our sample to Compustat and 
to data from Derwent LitAlert, 
a source of data about patent 
and trademark litigation, to 
obtain information on firm 
characteristics and patents involved in the lawsuits. We also used 
financial information on publicly listed NPEs from Compustat. 
estimating cumulative abnormal returns | To estimate the 
impact of a lawsuit filing on the value of a firm, we use event 
study methodology. In particular, we use the dummy variable 
method. This assumes that stock returns follow a market model, 
(1)   rt  a  b rtm  t
where  rt is the return on a particular stock at time t, rtm is the com-
pounded return on a market portfolio, and t is a stochastic error. 
If an event such as a lawsuit filing occurs on day T, then there 
may be an “abnormal return” to the particular stock on that day. 
This can be captured using a dummy variable,
(2)   rt  a  b rtm  tt
where t equals 1 if t = T and 0 otherwise. 
Equation (2) can be estimated using OLS for a single event. In 
practice, this equation is estimated over the event period and also 
over a sufficiently long pre-event window. In this paper we use a 
200 trading-day pre-event window. The coefficient estimate of  
obtained by this procedure is then an estimate of the abnormal 
return on this particular stock. For different stocks, the precision 
of the estimates of  will vary depending on how well equation (2) 
fits the data. The estimated coefficient variance from the regres-
sion provides a measure of the precision of the estimate of the 
abnormal return.
We want to obtain a representative estimate of the abnor-
mal returns from lawsuit filings for multiple stocks under the 
assumption that these represent independent events and that 
they share the same underlying “true” mean. Previous papers 
estimating abnormal returns from patent lawsuits have simply 
reported unweighted means for the group of firms. Although 
the unweighted mean is an unbiased estimator, it is not efficient. 
While the lawsuits increase incentives 
to acquire vague, overreaching patents, 
they decrease incentives for real innovation.
Winter 2011-2012 | Regulation | 29 
patent litigation where 85 percent of defendants are solo.
Another difference is the distribution of these patents across 
technology classes. Looking at the main patent listed in Derwent, 
about 62 percent of the patents are software patents, using the 
technology class categorization used in Bessen (2011). Using the 
National Bureau for Economic Research categorization of firms, 
75 percent of the patents are in computer and communications 
technology. Thus, this sample shows the same concentration of 
NPE litigation in software and related technologies as in earlier 
studies. Both this technological concentration and the prevalence 
of multiple defendants are important for interpreting the nature 
of the current crop of NPEs.
estimates of cumulative abnormal returns | Table 3 reports 
basic estimates of CARs for the sample of NPE defendants. 
Columns 1 and 2 report the weighted mean (with standard 
error) and median values. The first row shows the results using 
a five-day event window that starts one day before the lawsuit 
filing and continues through the fourth day after. The mean 
loss is 0.32 percent and the median loss is 0.52 percent. 
One concern is that this estimate of lost value might reflect a 
temporary overreaction on the part of investors. Given that there 
are now hundreds of these troll lawsuits every year, it is hard to 
understand why investors would consistently overreact and never 
learn from their mistakes. Nevertheless, a persistent overreaction 
would be noticed by arbitrageurs who would then come in, buy 
the artificially low stock, and thus drive the price up to a more 
accurate level. If it took some time for arbitrageurs to enter, the 
price we observe during the five-day event window might be arti-
ficially low, making our estimate of losses too high.
One way to check this is to look at a longer event window to 
Since we are concerned with obtaining the best estimate to use in 
policy calculations (and not just testing the sign of the mean), we 
use a weighted mean to estimate the “average abnormal return,” 
where the weight for each observation is proportional to the 
inverse of the variance of the estimate of  for that firm.
When we test our means against the null hypothesis that the 
true mean is zero, we report both the significance of t-tests using 
the weighted mean and also the significance of the Z statistic, a 
widely used parametric test of significance that incorporates the 
variation in precision across events. In any case, the significance test 
results are closely similar, as are those of some nonparametric tests.
Finally, (2) describes the abnormal return for a single day. It is 
straightforward to design dummy variables to estimate a “cumu-
lative abnormal return” (CAR) over an event window consisting 
of multiple consecutive days. In the following, for instance, if the 
suit is filed on date t = T, then we may use a window from day 
T – 1 to T + 4.
Empirical Findings
Some characteristics of defendant firms in our sample are 
reported in Table 1. These are, on average, large firms. Almost 
two-thirds of the firms are technology companies, including 
software and communications companies, and these firms, 
on average, spend a lot on R&D and have very substantial 
intangible assets. A significant number of financial, retail, and 
wholesale firms are also represented. These firms are typically 
subject to multiple NPE lawsuits. 
Table 2 shows that most of the NPE disputes involve multiple 
defendants, either in the same suit or from multiple suits filed by 
the NPE on the same day. (See also Chien 2009.) The number of 
publicly listed defendants mostly ranges between two and nine 
defendants (median of five). Only 17 percent of the defendants 
were the sole defendant listed. This contrasts sharply with other 
table 1
summary statistics of defendant firms
mean median
Revenue (millions of $2010) $34,487 $13,232
R&D spending (millions of $2010) $1,779 $531
Intangible assets (millions of $2010) $9,792 $1,269
Employees (thousands) 9.4 3.6
NPE lawsuits per firm (1990–2010) 26.1 12
industRy (2-dIgIt sIC Code) PeRcent
Electronics (36) 22




Financial services (60–67) 8
notes: Means of firm characteristics are over 3,821 firm-events. this is a sample of publicly 
listed firms.
table 2
summary characteristics of lawsuits





In litigation with 10 or more defendants 32
Software patent 62
Patent technology classes (nBeR) PeRcent
Chemical 1
Computers and communications 75
Drugs and medical 1
Electrical and electronics 12
Mechanical 4
Other 8
notes: the number of defendants in the lawsuits is for all lawsuits filed by the same nPe 
on the same day. Patent characteristics are for a subsample matched to derwent litalert 
and are for the first patent listed in the suit. the categorization of software patents is 
described in bessen (2011). We have adapted the nber technology classes (Hall et al. 
2001) to the current technology class system, adding classes 398, 715, 717, 725, and 726 to 
the computers and communications category. this sample consists of publicly listed firms.
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see if the stock showed evidence of recovery over the subsequent 
month or so. The second row reports results for a comparable 
analysis using a 25-day window. If it took some time before wiser 
investors arbitraged the stock, then we should see some evidence 
of a price correction within this longer window. Instead, the 
CARs in this row are slightly larger (more negative) than those in 
the five-day window. This suggests that the initial loss of wealth 
was not an overreaction by investors that was subsequently cor-
rected, at least not within 25 days. Because the longer window has 
larger standard errors as a result of the measurement technique, 
we use the sample with the five-day event window for most of the 
remaining analysis.
Perhaps, instead, the stock price stays artificially low until the 
lawsuit is resolved. This might be the case if investors react to the 
uncertainty of the lawsuit, demanding a higher return on invest-
ment until the uncertainty is resolved. If this were the case, then 
we should see an increase in the stock price at the announcement 
that the suit was settled. However, two event studies of lawsuit 
settlements—Haslem (2005) and Bhagat et al. (1998)—find no 
such positive correction on average. This suggests that investors 
overall appear to anticipate settlement correctly, pricing it into 
the share value. Thus this theory, too, seems difficult to reconcile 
with the evidence. While we accept the idea that investors do not 
always act rationally, we have found no explanation consistent 
with the evidence for why investors should persistently overreact 
to lawsuit filings.
The estimated CARs are substantially smaller than those 
found in the study of all patent lawsuits involving publicly listed 
firms from 1984 to 1999 by Bessen and Meurer (2007). The third 
row shows the CARs for defendant firms from that study and 
the fourth row shows the CARs from solo defendant firms in 
that study. We parse out the results in the fourth row to provide 
the most relevant comparison to the NPE lawsuits in this study. 
Most NPE lawsuits in our current study have multiple defendants 
(83 percent). Most of the lawsuits in our earlier studies involved a 
single defendant (85 percent); we suspect that almost all of those 
lawsuits do not involve an NPE plaintiff. The mean CAR for all 
single-defendant lawsuits is nearly twice as large as the mean CAR 
reported for the five-day window in the NPE sample. This differ-
ence is also statistically significant.
The NPE CARs are also much smaller than those reported 
in the previous literature on patent litigation event studies. For 
example, Bhagat et al. (1998) study 33 defendants of patent 
lawsuits announced in the Wall Street Journal. They find a mean 
CAR of –1.50 percent, nearly five times larger than the estimate 
here. Studying 26 biotech firms, Lerner (1995) found a 2.0 per-
cent reduction in the wealth of the defendants and plaintiffs 
combined. 
Why smaller percentage losses? | One clear reason that the 
NPE lawsuits have lower CARs than in previous studies is that 
the sample of defendants in the NPE lawsuits is very different 
from the samples in the earlier studies. Some of those studies 
found much larger losses but used highly select small samples 
of lawsuits that had been announced in the Wall Street Journal or 
Dow Jones News Service. Bessen and Meurer (2007) show that 
patent lawsuits announced in the Wall Street Journal tended to 
involve companies with greater capital per employee and higher 
stock market betas. These factors might be directly related to 
larger percentage losses on the announcement of a lawsuit.
The lawsuits involving publicly listed firms in Bessen and 
Meurer (2007) were not necessarily announced, but these, too, 
show larger percentage losses than in the current sample of 
NPE lawsuits, although not so much larger. The NPE sample of 
public firms differs from that 
sample in two important ways: 
NPE lawsuits tend to involve 
larger defendants and multiple 
defendants.
Although larger defen-
dants tend to have smaller 
CARs (Bessen and Meurer 
2007), size-related differences 
cannot directly explain much 
of the difference in the CARs 
between the samples. The dif-
ference in the CARs between 
small and large firms is simply 
not large enough to account 
for the difference in the NPE 
sample and these small firms 
only make up 14 percent of the 
NPE sample in any case. 
Nevertheless, the large size 
of the defendants in the NPE 
lawsuits and the fact that so 
table 3
cumulative abnormal Returns of defendants in nPe litigation
cumulative aBnoRmal RetuRns loss of common stock value  
(MIllIons of $2010)
samPle mean median RoBust Z 
statistic
mean median aggRegate n












–0.71% –2.04** $140.6 $23.6 $579,217 4,119
all Patent litigation, 1984–1999 (bessen and Meurer 2007)
All suits –0.50% 
(0.16)***






notes: standard errors in parentheses. ** = significant at 5 percent level; *** = significant at 1 percent level. average cumulative abnormal 
returns are weighted means, with weights proportional to the inverse of the estimated variance of each return. event window is five days 
(t – 1 to t + 4) or 25 days (t – 1 to t + 24). Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using ols. the robust Z statistic is a joint test of the 
individual firm t statistics (Kramer 2001). 
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many of these lawsuits involve multiple defendants changes the 
economics of litigation in an important way: in these circum-
stances, litigation might still be credible for plaintiffs who have a 
low probability of winning. A lawsuit only poses a credible threat 
if the plaintiff’s expected gains from winning exceed the costs 
from litigating. The expected gains are the ex ante probability of 
winning multiplied by the conditional benefits of winning. Nor-
mally, a lawsuit with a low probability of winning does not pose 
a credible threat. However, when a patent has a chance of being 
interpreted broadly so that it reads on the business of multiple 
large companies, the payoff from winning might be so large that 
the threat of a lawsuit is credible even if the probability of win-
ning is low. 
This provides another possible explanation for lower-percent-
age losses found in NPE lawsuits: the plaintiffs in a substantial 
portion of NPE lawsuits might have low probabilities of winning 
at court, hence these lawsuits will cause smaller losses to defen-
dants, all else equal. Because many of these suits might involve 
aggressive interpretations of patent scope, allowing the claims to 
read on many defendants, they might have lower probabilities of 
winning, but still provide credible threats because of the multiple 
defendants. This explanation is supported by Allison et al. (2011) 
who find that NPE suits with multiple defendants are more likely 
to settle and, when they do go to trial, the plaintiffs are much 
more likely to lose (but see Shrestha 2010). This explanation is 
thus plausible; however, our evidence for it is not conclusive.
loss of wealth | Nevertheless, just because the percentage loss 
of defendant firms is smaller in NPE lawsuits, this does not 
imply that the loss of wealth is small. Using the CAR estimates, 
we can calculate the loss of wealth that occurs upon a lawsuit 
filing. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 show the mean and median 
loss of wealth calculated by multiplying the mean CAR by 
each firm’s capitalization. The mean wealth lost per lawsuit is 
$122 million in 2010 dollars and the median loss is $20.4 mil-
lion. These figures are substantially higher than the previous 
estimates for patent lawsuits of all types found by Bessen and 
Meurer (2007), shown in row 3. These estimates are, of course, 
much larger than the direct costs of legal fees. They also include 
the costs of lost business, management distraction and diver-
sion of productive resources that might result from the lawsuit, 
possible payments needed to settle the suit, and the reduction 
in expectations of profits from future opportunities that are 
forestalled or foreclosed because of the suit.
Investors’ expectations of future profits are notoriously vola-
tile. To the extent that one might want to gauge the effect of the 
lawsuits on current profits while excluding expectations about 
future profits, it is possible to make some crude adjustments 
to the above figures. One method is to divide the estimated 
loss of wealth by the ratio of the market capitalization of the 
firm’s common stock divided by the value of the firm’s capital 
assets. This reduces the mean wealth lost to $112 million in 2010 
dollars. Alternatively, the loss can be divided by the ratio of the 
total market value of the firm to the value of the firm’s capital 
assets, reducing the mean loss to $64 million in 2010 dollars. 
These figures are also quite substantial and, although investors’ 
expectations of future profits might occasionally be “exuberant,” 
our basic estimate nevertheless captures the actual loss of wealth 
related to the lawsuit.
Thus, although the NPE CARs are lower than the CARs 
for other lawsuits, the mean loss per lawsuit is larger because 
the market capitalization of the NPE defendants is that much 
larger. This, combined with the tendency of NPE lawsuits to 
involve multiple defendants, means that these suits have an 
outsized impact on firm wealth. Aggregating over the sample 
(column 6) shows that NPE lawsuits from 1990 through Octo-
ber 2010 are responsible for over half a trillion dollars in lost 
wealth (in 2010 dollars). From 2007 through October 2010, the 
losses average over $83 billion per year in 2010 dollars, which 
equals over a quarter of U.S. industrial R&D spending per 
annum. Moreover, because this total is only for publicly listed 
firms, it likely understates the true loss of wealth resulting from 
NPE lawsuits.
Private Losses and Social Losses
Whatever the theoretical and historical roles NPEs might have 
played in facilitating markets for technology, it is clear that the 
current crop of NPE litigation is responsible for an unprec-
edented loss of wealth. Is this private loss of wealth to the 
defendants also a loss to society?
transfers | These private losses might or might not correspond 
to social losses. Litigation incurs static social losses when it 
involves socially wasteful activity. Aside from direct legal fees, 
litigation often involves a diversion of management resources 
away from productive activity. It may also involve a loss of 
consumer welfare. For example, preliminary injunctions can 
shut down production and sales while the litigation pends. 
Even without a preliminary injunction, customers may stop 
buying a product. And the threat of final injunction might 
require the defendant to rework its product drastically or 
even abandon it. Frequently, products require customers to 
make complementary investments; they may not be willing 
to make these investments if a lawsuit poses some risk that 
the product will be withdrawn from the market. Furthermore, 
patent owners can threaten customers and suppliers with 
patent lawsuits because patent infringement extends to every 
party who makes, uses, or sells a patented technology without 
permission, and sometimes to those who participate indirectly 
in the infringement. 
A detailed study of the economic effects of one NPE litiga-
tion found that the affected business divisions of the defendant 
firms experienced revenue declines of about one-third (Tucker 
2011). Moreover, the defendant firms avoided releasing any new 
products in the technology field for two years while the lawsuits 
proceeded. The litigation not only delayed consumer surplus, but 
also delayed the development of new technology. 
P r o P e r t y
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These social losses might be offset if NPE 
litigation acts like an investment in a reputa-
tion for toughness that deters future piracy. 
We doubt this is the case. There is simply no 
evidence that a significant number of defen-
dants in NPE suits are pirates; later we dis-
cuss evidence showing that they are mostly 
inadvertent infringers. Furthermore, NPE 
litigation is rising over time, not declining as 
it should if the reputational story were true.
A more important consideration is the 
extent to which private losses arise from 
transfers of wealth to other parties that 
do not incur a static loss of social welfare. 
When defendants make payments to NPEs 
to settle lawsuits or subsequent to legal 
judgments, the private loss to the defendant 
is not socially wasteful. To what extent do 
the half-trillion dollars in private losses cor-
respond to such expected transfers?
To explore transfers to NPEs and, in turn, transfers from NPEs 
to independent inventors, we assembled a list of NPE firms in our 
database that are publicly listed. We identified 14 firms, listed 
in Table 4. These firms account for 574 litigation events in our 
data, about 14 percent of the total. The aggregate losses to the 
defendants in those lawsuits from 2000 through October 2010 
total $87.6 billion in 2010 dollars, about 17 percent of the total 
in our database.
How much of this loss represents a transfer to the NPEs? 
Table 5 shows the cumulative flow of several financial variables 
over this same time period. Total revenues over these years come 
to $7.6 billion, about 9 percent of the total loss to defendants. 
Revenues necessarily overstate any transfers from the defendants 
to the NPEs because they also include revenues from firms that 
are not involved in litigation and from private firms. Nevertheless, 
it is quite clear that most of the defendants’ private loss is not a 
transfer to NPEs. 
Another possible transfer occurs to the defen-
dant’s competitors. To the extent that patent litiga-
tion causes customers to select a rival product or 
service, some of the lost business captured in the 
above calculations represents a transfer to rival 
firms. Of course, because the NPEs sue multiple 
parties, it happens frequently that a firm and its 
rivals are sued at the same time, so that no such 
transfer would occur. This provides us a simple test 
of the magnitude of potential transfers to rivals: if 
such transfers are substantial, we should see smaller 
CARs when a firm and its rival are sued than in 
cases where rivals are not sued. We identified 1,914 
events (47 percent of the events) where a firm was 
sued along with another firm in the same Standard 
Industrial Classification 3-digit industry. However, 
the CARs for these events were slightly higher than 
in those cases where a rival firm was not 
also sued. Thus this test is inconsistent with 
substantial transfers to rivals.
Another transfer occurs to the lawyers, 
expert witnesses, etc., involved in the lawsuits. 
Estimates of legal costs from Bessen and 
Meurer (2007) suggest these transfers cannot 
be more than a few percent of the loss.
We also conducted event studies of the 
NPE stocks around the lawsuit filings. The 
NPE stocks also lost wealth in that time. 
Although other factors might cause a drop 
in the plaintiffs’ market capitalizations (Bes-
sen and Meurer 2007), this evidence is not 
consistent with large transfers of wealth to 
the NPEs.
In summary, while there are some limited 
transfers to NPEs and to rivals and lawyers, 
most of the private losses incurred by defen-
dants in NPE litigation do not appear to be 
transfers to other parties. Presumably, most of the losses corre-
spond to static losses of social welfare.
encouraging innovation | Of course, NPE litigation might also 
produce dynamic gains in social welfare if transfers to inde-
pendent inventors increase innovation incentives. How much 
of the transfer to NPEs is subsequently transferred to inven-
tors outside of the NPEs? The investment that NPEs make 
in acquiring patents is included in the accounting category 
“net cash flow to investing activities.” This figure less capital 
expenditures is shown in Table 5. Although this figure includes 
other investments in addition to payments to outside inventors, 
it is small compared to the defendants’ losses: $1.7 billion, or 
about 2 percent of the defendants’ losses. The investments 
made in patents are also included in the NPE’s intangible assets, 
although these quantities are amortized. 
Table 5 also reports intangible assets for fiscal 2010. It is less 
table 5






cumulative foR 14 nPes, 2000–2010
Revenues $7,639 9
Net cash flow to investing activi-
ties less capital expenditures
$1,697 2
R&D expense $2,039 2
Net income $258 0
comBined stock foR 14 nPes, 2010
Intangible assets $562 1
defendant fiRms
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than $600 million, about 1 percent of the defendants’ losses. 
Note again that both the intangible assets and the net cash flow 
to investing activities generate revenues from sources other than 
our defendants, so these figures might overstate transfers to 
independent inventors. In any case, we can state that less than 
2 percent of the defendants’ losses could represent a transfer to 
independent inventors and quite possibly the true figure is much 
smaller than 2 percent.
Some of the NPEs also conduct their own R&D. Indeed, capi-
talized R&D investments are included in the intangible assets of 
the firm. The R&D expense flows are also not large, around 2 
percent of the loss.
It is likely that the R&D investments and acquisitions from 
outside inventors will yield value to the NPE firms beyond 2010. 
To the extent that this is true, all of these figures overstate the 
extent to which these investments are tied to the defendant losses 
occurring through 2010. That is, some portion of these invest-
ments is related to defendant losses that will be incurred after 
2010, so only a portion of the investment can be attributed to a 
transfer of wealth from the pre-2011 defendants. 
Although the transfer to inventors is small, it is still positive. 
Does this mean that NPE litigation nevertheless increases innova-
tion incentives? There are three reasons to conclude that it does 
not. First and foremost, the losses to technology firms who are 
defendants in this litigation are two orders of magnitude larger. 
These losses imply a very large 
disincentive to innovation for 
these firms—firms that spend 
heavily on R&D. Studies show 
that the more a firm spends on 
R&D, the more likely it is to be 
sued for patent infringement 
(Bessen and Meurer 2005). 
Moreover, very rarely are the 
defendants in these lawsuits 
found to have actually copied 
the patented technology (Bessen and Meurer 2008, p. 126; Cotro-
pia and Lemley 2009). Instead, they are inadvertent infringers, if 
infringers at all. This means that they have to anticipate the risk 
of future lawsuit-related losses as part of their cost of developing 
new technology and products. This risk is a disincentive to invest 
in innovation, and our results find that it is a very large disin-
centive, much larger than any possible incentives provided by 
transfers to independent inventors via NPEs. Even if incentives to 
small inventors were much more fertile than incentives provided 
to large technology firms—producing two, three, or even 10 times 
as many innovations—the incentives flowing to small inventors 
would not offset the very much larger disincentives imposed on 
the technology firms.
Second, to the extent that independent inventors benefit by 
licensing or selling their inventions to large firms, this risk of 
inadvertent infringement reduces their innovation incentives as 
well. Because their prospective licensees have to anticipate the 
risk of an NPE lawsuit, this risk decreases the amount licensees 
are willing to pay. Thus the very large losses incurred by defen-
dants tend to reduce the market for technology for independent 
inventors.
Finally, the incentives provided to patent holders by the cur-
rent crop of NPEs may be the wrong kind of incentives. NPE 
activity may skew the research agenda of small firms away from 
disruptive technologies and toward mainstream technology and 
associated patents that can be asserted against big incumbents. 
Even worse, small firms are encouraged to divert investment from 
genuine invention toward simply obtaining broad and vague 
patents that might one day lead to a credible, if weak, lawsuit. 
To summarize, there are a lot of big losers from NPE litigation, 
while hardly anyone benefits much. The defendant firms and 
their customers lose, while patent holders gain very little by com-
parison. Even the investors in NPE firms have gained little—these 
firms barely break even based on their cumulative net income in 
Table 5. Apparently, the only real beneficiaries are the lawyers and 
perhaps the principals of the NPE firms.
The New Business Model
These findings should be interpreted cautiously. While there 
are large losses from NPE litigation, not all NPEs today are 
opportunistic litigators. Nor does this imply that NPEs have 
not played a more positive role in the past. It is important to 
understand what is uniquely different about the NPEs that are 
behind today’s litigation surge. 
Indeed, today’s NPEs tell us they are different. Proponents tell 
us they are a new breed of company—a new business model—that 
is misunderstood (McDonough 2006, Myhrvold 2010). They tell 
us that NPEs are, in fact, good for society because they are creat-
ing “a capital market for invention” by buying patents and selling 
licenses. This helps “turbocharge technological progress” “by 
realigning market participant incentives, making patents more 
liquid, and clearing the patent market.” 
What, exactly, is new about this business model and what does 
it mean for innovation? Markets for technology have been around 
at least since the 19th century and studies have documented 
some of the benefits of those markets (for example, Arora et al. 
2004): they give inventors a way of getting money for their inven-
tions, thus providing them with stronger incentives to invent; 
and they help spread new technologies to the companies that can 
commercialize them the best. But most of this literature concerns 
There are a lot of big losers from NPE litigation, 
while hardly anyone benefits much.  
The defendant firms and their customers lose, 
while patent holders gain very little by comparison.
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markets for technology, not markets for patents. There is no evi-
dence the transactions occurring around NPE litigation involve 
the transfer of technology—news reports and judicial opinions 
indicate the defendants are already using the technology. Instead, 
these transactions typically occur long after the patents were 
issued (Allison et al. 2009, Love 2010, Risch 2012) and involve just 
the transfer of patent rights (and money). 
Even so, some advocates hold that NPEs are socially ben-
eficial because they reduce the costs of patent transactions 
(McDonough 2006). To the extent that NPEs facilitate the clear-
ance of patent rights before firms invest in technology, this is a 
clear benefit. The patent brokers and auctions facilitate trans-
actions, but that is not obviously true for those NPEs that are 
primarily involved in asserting and litigating patents. Moreover, 
to the extent that these NPE transactions occur only after firms 
invest in technology, any savings in transaction costs has to be 
offset by the associated dispute costs. We have shown that the 
litigation losses amount to over half a trillion dollars, so these 
dispute costs are substantial. No reasonable estimate of the 
transaction costs of licensing these patents could approach the 
magnitude of these litigation losses.
The pattern of NPE patent litigation casts further doubt on 
the view that NPE patent enforcement has any connection to 
technology transfer. Is it possible that large numbers of innova-
tive firms, in case after case, are pirating the technology disclosed 
in NPE patents? Why are the numbers so large? Perhaps the 
firms have colluded to jointly pirate the technology, or perhaps 
all of these firms have independently decided to pirate the same 
technology. Not likely. We think the plausible explanation is that 
the many firms who end up as defendants in these cases have 
independently created the invention or derived the claimed tech-
nology from some source other than the NPE patent.
Multiple inadvertent infringements are especially likely for a 
general-purpose technology like software. As noted above, NPE 
lawsuits are concentrated in one technology area: software and 
software-related patents, including business methods. Conse-
quently, this litigation has a disproportionately large effect on 
firms working with these technologies. A thumbnail calcula-
tion suggests that NPEs account for about 41 percent of patent 
litigation involving software patents. So NPE litigation is quite 
significant for this technology.
Thus the new business model for NPEs is not about licensing 
patents in general; it is mainly about licensing software patents, 
including patents on business and financial processes (Chien 
2009). This is significant because we have argued elsewhere that 
software patent litigation has risen dramatically because of 
eroding patent notice and that software patents have been an 
important contributor to this trend (Bessen and Meurer 2008). 
That is, software patents have “fuzzy boundaries”: they have 
unpredictable claim interpretation and unclear scope; lax enable-
ment and obviousness standards make the validity of many of 
these patents questionable; and the huge number of software 
patents granted makes thorough search to clear rights infeasible, 
especially when the patent applicants hide claims for many years 
by filing continuations. This gives rise to many situations in 
which technology firms inadvertently infringe. And this means 
that there is a business opportunity based on acquiring patents 
that can be read to cover existing technologies and asserting those 
patents, litigating if necessary in order to obtain a licensing agree-
ment. Models by Reitzig et al. (2007) and Turner (2011) show that 
the patent troll business model 
only makes economic sense 
when there is such inadvertent 
infringement. And the rise 
in NPE litigation has closely 
mirrored the rise in software 
patent litigation (Bessen 2011). 
Moreover, fuzzy boundaries 
can explain why so many NPE 
lawsuits have multiple defen-
dants: many firms may have 
reasonably concluded that they did not infringe, or the patents 
were invalid, or they may have been unable to find these patents 
while conducting a clearance search. Later, they encounter an 
NPE that sues over an aggressively broad interpretation of the 
patent’s scope and validity. 
Thus, “fuzzy boundaries” for software and business method 
patents enable the rise of this new business model. Large num-
bers of hidden patents or patents with unpredictable boundaries 
provide an opportunity to extract rents from technology firms. 
Further, because NPEs have no operating business, technology 
firms cannot retaliate with countersuits. Combine this with 
capital markets to fund the acquisition of patents and to conduct 
litigation and you get a viable business model. But this is a very 
different business from the business pursued by those patent 
brokers, consultants, and auctioneers who facilitate markets for 
technology. 
Conclusion
Firms that buy and license technologies can improve the mar-
ket for technology and thus improve the innovation incen-
tives for independent inventors. Patent agents and markets for 
technology have been an important part of the U.S. innovation 
system since the 19th century. 
But the role of the current NPEs who assert and litigate patents 
is something altogether different. It is focused on software and 
There is no evidence that transactions occurring 
around NPE litigation involve transfers of technology. 
Instead, these transactions typically occur long after 
the patents were issued.
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related technologies, it targets firms that have already developed 
technology, and it is very much about litigation, especially litigation 
in the special circumstances where multiple large parties can be 
sued at the same time. Whatever the general benefits of technology 
markets, this does not obscure the fact that this particular manifes-
tation involves large amounts of costly litigation. It is hard to believe 
that markets can be somehow improved by having thousands of 
lawsuits that incur hundreds of billions of dollars in losses. 
We have shown that defendants have lost over half a trillion dol-
lars in wealth—over $83 billion per year during recent years—and 
this has not improved incentives to innovate. While the lawsuits 
might increase incentives to acquire vague, overreaching patents, 
they do not increase incentives for real innovation. The defendants 
in these lawsuits are firms that already invest a lot in innovation. 
Their losses make it more expensive for them to continue to do 
so and it also makes them less willing to license new technologies 
from small inventors. Meanwhile, independent inventors benefit 
very little from what the large companies lose. 
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